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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
RICITLL\RD N. PE·TERSON and 
l\l1\XINE H. PETERSON, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
vs. 
.J. LOWELL PLATIT and 
JOSEPH W. BEES·LEY, 
Def()1lda11ts-Appellants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
NATURE OF OF THE ·CASE 
Case No. 
138239 
Essentially, this is is an action for conversion of 
personal property located in a drive-in food establish-
Iuent, and for resulting drunages. Defendant counter-
claiined for unpaid lease rentals and drunages for breach 
of lPa~P. 
DISPOSITIO~ IN LOWER COURT 
The lo\Yer court granted judgment for plaintiff on 
the complaint and denied defendant's counterclaim. The 
judgn1ent granted consisted of: 
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(a) $ 181.48 lease rental pro-ration; 
(b) $8,527.7 4 equitable interest in equipment; 
(c) $ 654.19 interest in other equipment; 
(d) $1,644.63 other items of personal property; 
( P) $1,632.00 items of inventory; 
(f) $ 10.00 mental anguish; and 
(g) $1,000.00 punitive damages; 
making a total judgment of $13,650.04, and costs. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON AP'PEAL 
Defendant seeks reversal of the entire judgment of 
the lower court, and an award of jugment to defendant 
and against plaintiff in the amount of $1,250.00 on the 
counterclaim. 
STATEMENT' OF F AC1TS 
Richard N. Peterson and Maxine H. Peterson, his 
\Yife, are the plaintiffs-respondents; and J. Lo,vell Platt 
and Joseph W. Beesley are the defendants. For practi-
cal purposes, Richard N. Peterson is referred to as 
the plaintiff in this brief and .J. Lowell Platt is referred 
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to as the dPfl}ndant, both referl\nces In the singular. 
\YhPn ~llrxine 11. PPt('rson is refPITPd to, she is nlen-
tionPd as "pla intifrs 'vif<'," although in faet slH\ is a 
part~· plaintiff'; and and Joseph \\'". BePslPy is not rP-
t'PtTPd t.o at all in this brief. It is believed this designa-
tion \rill assist the court in identifying the partiPs in 
,,·hat is a rather involYPd fact situation. 
The facts, rather than the law, "~in determine this 
appPal, although the trial judge committPd error of 
both la\\~ and faet. To prPsent the facts fully, defendant 
ha8 PlPetPd to set forth a rather detailed, chronological 
report of the facts as thPy "~PrP stated by plaintiff and 
his ,,~itnessPs, and this appears under Point I of the 
argtunent. t'"nder the HtatPrnent of Facts as here pre-
sPnted, defendant "Till sirnply quote verbatim the Find-
ings 1nade and Pntered by the trial court. This is for 
thP eonvenience of the Court on appeal, because defend-
ant ,,·ill later sho"v the gross error in the court's findings 
as quoted belo\\T. 
But before quoting the court's findings, defendant 
"ill 1nake one sin1ple observation of fact that is of 
critical i1nportance on appeal because it entitles de-
fendant to l'l\versal of the judgment granted by the 
lo\\'"er court. It is i1nportant to emphasize and remem-
ber this fact, because a considerable attempt \viii be 
n1ade hy plaintiff's counsel on appeal, as \Vas made in 
the lo"~Pr court, to eonfuse this fact. The critical fact 
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is this: The entire judgment 'vas based upon a conver-
sion and damages resulting therefrom, although plain-
tiff, if he ever had a right of action for conversion, 
elected not to consider it a conversion, but actually 
sold and assigned all of his right, title and interest in 
the property which he claimed was converted. This is 
fatally inconsistent with the theory of conversion, and, 
as the conversion falls, so falls all other segments of 
the judgment awarded. For this reason, considerable 
time has been spent, and space utilized, to frame the 
complete factual picture, so that the undisputed fact of 
plaintiff's continued claim of ownership after the con-
version can he seen in the complete setting. In so doing, 
defendant does not abandon his other points on appeal, 
but simply suggests the other points are moot after the 
conversion finding is reversed, and defendant is entitled 
to judgment on his counterclaim. 
Well, back to the trial court's findings, 'vhich de-
fendant now quotes in full, but writhout approval: 
FINDINGS OF F A~CT 
1. Defendant, J. Lowell Platt is and at all times 
herein concerned wa~ a resident of Salt Lake County. 
TTtah. 
2. On the lOth day of June, 1960, the plaintiffs en-
tered into a L~ea8e Agree1nent "'"it.h defendant~~ ,Yith 
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plainti f'f~ H~ }p~SPP~ and t hP defendants a~ lP~~OrS Of land 
and a building to hP constrn('ted then·on by le~~or \Yhich 
prPini~(·~ hPenntP kno\\'TI as H ~·:\ retic Circle Drive-In" at 
f{ighland DrivP and Gunn ~·:\venue, Halt Lake City, l"'"tah. 
( )n thP ~atne day, the plaintiffs delivered to the defend-
ant, ,J. Lo\\'Pll Platt, a chPek in thP an1ount of $1,250.00, 
rPprp:-;enting advaneP payinPnt of the last t\vo 1nonths 
of thP I~Pa~P. 
:3. ·The building was not ready for occupane:v until 
~\ ug-u~t :z;~, 1960, at \\'hi('h time the plaintiffs entered into 
po~~P~~ion of the prPinisps-the plaintiffR paying defend-
ants $()~fl.OO as rent for the period commencing August 
:2:~, 1 !160, and ending Repte1nber 22, 1960. 
-t-. { ~ontinuing from the aforesaid date of August 
:2:1, 1960, to and including August 10, 1962, the plaintiffs 
orcupiPd, operated and possessed the premises, conduct-
ing thereon a public food distribution systen1 known as 
"~t\.rr.tie Circle Drive-In.'' 
t). Concurrently \Yith the payment by plaintiffs to 
defendants of the $()25.00 on August 23, 1960, the parties 
agreed that the 1nonthly rent period provided in the Lease 
he runended to, and thereafter should be, from the 23rd 
day of Pach month \vith the term of the Lea:-;e to eonl-
Inence ~A. n~·n~t :2:3, 1960. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
6. In December, 1961 and January, 1962, the plain-
tiffs paid only a one-half month's rent, and in April, 
1962, the plaintiffs failed to pay the current rent for that 
month. Plaintiffs, however, subsequently paid the cur-
rent rental for succeeding months, including the rental 
due and payable on May 23, 1962, and likewise rental due 
and payable on June 23rd and July 23, 1962. Thus, by 
August 14, 1962, plaintiffs had paid the rental on the 
premises to August 23, 1963, though there were two 
months' back rent unpaid resulting from the one-half 
payment made in December, 1961, and January, 1962, and 
the failure to pay any rental in April, 1962. 
7. During the period of time that plaintiffs occu-
pied the Drive-In property, the defendants never at any 
time made any demands on plaintiffs for the payment 
of delinquent rental, nor was any notice ever given to 
plaintiffs of any default on the part of plaintiffs in the 
performance of the Lease or of any intention on the part 
of defendants to terminate the plaintiff's occupancy of 
the prPmi SP~. 
8. During the nighttin1e or early morning of August 
14, 1962, the defendant, Platt, \vithout notice or \v·arning 
to plaintiffs \vhatsoever and \Yithout authority of plain-
tiffs, went to the Driv~-In premises, changed the lock on 
the building, parked his camper in front of the door 
' 
and denied plaintiffs aceess to the Drive-In and thus 
"'took ovPr'' the premises. On being notified by the early 
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tnorning help of dPfendant 's artion, the plaintiff, Richard 
~. J>PtPrson, \\'Pnt to the premisP~ and requested Platt to 
opPn thP door~, to g-Pt the business open, and then to sit 
do\\"Il and iron out \Yhat differences thPrP were, all of 
\\·hirh I>latt defiantly rPfused to do. Partienlarly did 
J>•}tPr~on request that hP be given the perishables and 
hi~ hookkPPping and payroll records, all of \Yhich was 
again refused by Platt in an arrogant and defiant man-
nPr. Defendant, Platt, would not even 1Pt Peterson have 
aerPss to thP tPlephone in the pren1ises to call the em-
ployeP~ and advise then1 not to come to 'vork. 
9. The Court finds that thP conduct of the defend-
ant, Platt, \\'"as overt, uncalled for, colored 'vith malice 
and an1ounted to an unlawful termination of the Lease 
and conversion of Peterson's property \Yithin the prem-
10. At the time of the lockout and take-over by the 
defendant, J. Lo\YPll Platt, the following items and prop-
erty \YPre \Yithin the prenlises, all of which "\Vere convert-
ed h~? the defendant, Platt : 
(a) Equipn1ent being purchased by the Petersons, 
from .. A.rrtie Circle, Inc. under a conditional sales con-
tract (Exhibit X o. 6, p. 1), the value of Peterson's 
~quity eonverted being $8,527.7-1. 
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(b) Equipment (Exhibit No.7, page 1) not covered 
by the conditional sales contract (Value: $2,366.19) less 
the amount of the Marvion Sign Obligation ($1,712.00). 
-----------------------_$654.19 
(c) Other items of personal property (Exhibit K o. 
7, page 2), having a value of $1,644.63. 
(d) Inventory (Exhibit No. '7), having a value of 
$1,632.00 .. 
11. T·he equipment covered by the aforesaid Condi-
tional Sales Contract, Exhibit No. 6, which equipment was 
being purchased by the Petersons from Arctic Circle, 
Inc., was a special type of equipment manufactured for 
the particular type of business operated by plaintiffs. 
The equipment was of a peculiar and special nature and 
had no ready market value, and as a practical Inatter 
could only be replaced by the purchase of ne\Y Pquipnlent. 
12. At the time of the "lockout" and "take-over" by 
Platt, the Petersons had only a break-even business. In-
eome equaled the operating expenses but developed no 
interest on capital invested. 
13. The conduct on the part of Platt in terminating 
the Lease was very· upsetting to Peterson and the cause 
of considPrable embarrassment and mental suffering. 
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1-t ThP plaintiffs at no ti1ne entPrPd into collusion 
,,·ith or ('ooperatPd "·ith any third party fro1n ,,·hoin thPy 
\VPI'P pneha~ing any Pquipnlent or fixtures in an atteinpt 
to hara~~ the defendant~ or cause them to suffer any 
financial PxpensP or lo~s. The plaintiffs at all times per-
t inPnt her<' in aetPd in good faith. 
1!1. The PivdeneP fails to show that the defendant, 
.J. l.Jo\\·Pll T)1att, advanced any payments for SP\\?er and 
hui I ding taxes ,,~hich should have hPPn paid h~~ the plain-
ti rrs. X 0 ~urns \Vhatsoever reinained due and 0\Ving to 
thP defendant, ~J. Lo\\?Pll Platt, by the plaintiffs, Peter-
~on. 
16. The Pvidence fails to show that the plaintiffs 
Ina.liciou~ly or "·ithout just cause, excuse or reason, 
cau~Pd the \vaJPr to the prenlisPs to be disconnected 
\\'"ithout prior notice to the defendants prior to the time 
or the propPrt~? being vacated by the plaintiffs and 
orr.upied h~· the defendants. 
ARG·lTJIENT 
POINT NO. I. 
THERE WAS NO CONVERSION 
Since the trial court found the factual Issues gen-
erally in favor of the plaintiff, it is realized that it is 
difficult on appeal to upset the trial court's findings. 
Tlo\\'"ever, the critical aspects of this case depend upon 
the facts. and it is necessary to sho\v that the trial court's 
findings are inaccurate. unsupported by the evidence, 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10 
or directly contrary to the evidencP. The trial was 
rather long, beginning on October 10 and continuing 
until October 22, 1963, and the record, including the trans-
cript and depositions, substantially exceeds 1,000 pages 
in length. The following presentation of the evidence 
is an honest and fair extract of the record, vie"\Yed, as it 
must be, in the light most favorable to plaintiff. If con-
flicting testimony from defendant is used, such will be 
clearly stated, and the opposing testimony fro1n plaintiff 
or plaintiff's witnesses will be cited. 
(a) Background events leading to "lockout" · of 
August 14, 1962. 
Plaintiff operated an Arctic 1Circle franchised drive-
in located on 20th East and 33rd South, Salt Lake City, 
from 1954 until 1961 ( T. 9). Plaintiff's "\Yife was related 
to members of the Edwards family that controls the 
closely held Arctic Circle corporation ( T. 457). In the 
spring of 1960 plaintiff decided to acquire a drive-in ov-
Pration on 3068 Highland Drive, at the intersection with 
Gunn Avenue, Salt Lake City, and he executed a lease 
for a ten year term, "\vhereby he leased from defendant 
the ground with the building to be constructed ('T. 11). 
The lease was dated J unP 10, 1960, but defendant was ob-
ligated to build the building to Arctic Circle sp~·cifica-
tions, and it was anticipated that the building "~ould be 
eou1pleted August 10, 1960 (T. 11). The monthly rental 
payments "\\'"ere to be $62fl.OO per Inonth, and plaintiff 
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tnn.dP an initial payment of $1,:2;)0.00, \Vhich \Va~ to pay 
thP rPnt for the la~t t\vo Inonths under the lPasP (Ex. 1-1>, 
rr. :20). The l'Pgular lnonthly payinPnts \\'"Pre to begin on 
.\ ug-u~t 10, 19GO, ,,·hich \\·as the antieipated date of occu-
p:uu·~· ( t~:x. 1-P). 
The building ,,·as co1npleted nParly two \\'PPks later 
than anticipatPd, and plaintiff did not actually take oc-
enpaney until August 23, 1960 (T. 14-18). At this time 
dt ~fpndant had obligated or invested $105,000.00 in the 
building and thP land (T. 6(i-l-). \\Then dPfendant asked 
plaintiff for thP rent on August 23, plaintiff suggested 
that thP rPnt be pro-rated from then until the lOth 
of ~eptPinher, because plaintiff had been unable to take 
possPssion on thP anticipated date of August 10 (T. 
lS-~0). Defendant said that he needed the entire $625.00 
to 1nake an instalhnent payinPnt on the property, and that 
he \\'"ould prefer that plaintiff pay the full monthly rental, 
and then sin1ply pay succeeding rental payments on the 
23rd of Paeh Inonth, and plaintiff agreed (T.18-20). 
Plaintiff's business proved to be unsuccessful. He 
nPYer sho"red a profit on his tax returns (T. 539). He 
fell $1,:2;)0.00 behind in his lease rentals to defendant 
( T. :2:29-:30). He had bought substantial equipment from 
.A.retie Circle, and couldn't keep current in the payments. 
In fact the conditional sales contract required payments 
only during eight months of the year, and required no 
payn1ents during four months of \vinter when business 
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ordinarily 'vas slow (Ex. 10-P). Despite this, plaintiff 
in 1961 and 1962 succeeded in getting these payments 
temporarily reduced from $1,011.79 to $550.00, and he 
"\\7 as still having trouble (T. 473, 483-85). By August of 
1962 plaintiff had missed two of the reduced monthly 
payments ('T. 483-84). Perhaps Arctic Circle's reluctance 
to allow further arrearage on equipment payments was 
thP fact that plaintiff had accumulated an open account 
debt of about $15,000.00, and this debt was unsecured (T. 
143). Further, plaintiff received a $1,000.00 personal 
loan from an officer in the Arctic Circle organization, 
and did not pay it back ( T·. 494-95). 
Plaintiff's business was so bad that one of plaintiff's 
witnesses at the trial said it was "unique" in that respect 
(T. 439). This same winess, Don J. Edwards of Arctic. 
Circle, said he thought the business finally "\Vas about to 
a Hbreak-even" basis on August 14, 1962 ('T. 440). On 
cross-examination Don Ed,Yards explained "?hat hP 
1neant by ~'break-even," saying that it simply 1neant that 
gross income equalled operating expenses, but "\Vas not 
sufficient to pay installments or interest on equipn1ent 
purchases ( T. 4 7-1--80). Plain tiff also classified his own 
business as near the "break-even" point, and also admit-
ted a rather unusual VlP\\? of that tern1: 
Question: (By ~ir. 1fcMurray) ... would you 
explain to the court "?hat you mean hY the-
concept "breaking-even"; or "?hat you ~eant 
by the concept "break-even''. .. 
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A HS\\·Pr: \\"'"ell, that i~ \\.hPrP you-1ny concPpt 
or \vay I figure it i~ "·here your inco1ne and 
your outgo of your-your outgo or funds 
provided for absolute necessities of carrying 
on that bu~inP~~, Pqual. In other \vords, it is 
\\·herP your purehases and expenses and pay-
rolls amount to thP ~aJnP a~ your income, or 
figuring the break-Pven, I have never-! havP 
never enterPd into my O\Vn pPrsonal \\·ith-
dra\vals, back pay1nents or Pquipnlent, ,,·hich 
is, to me, capitalization, and of course the 
payments also included any break-do\vn of 
interPst on the contract. 
Question : Do I understand they are excluded~ 
AnR\ver: Those are excluded; nor have I ever 
figured depreciation in figuring my break-
even point. ( T. 502-03 ~ See T. 505). 
Plaintiff thus claimed that his business had reached 
a break-eYPn point, but that it could not pay any part of 
tlquip1nent purehases, no part of his salary or "personal 
dra\\·s,'' no interest 8xpense, and no depreciation. So, to 
an inYPstor. this break even business \vould lose at least 
$10,000.00 per year. ''"'"hy '?Because it \vould be necessary 
to hire son1eone to do \vhat plaintiff \vas doing~ and 
plaintiff \vas 1nanaging a business that \vas open 1nore 
than S-l- hour~ a "~eek ('T. -±64). Further, a reasonable 
allo\\yanee for depreciation "·ould have to be 1nade, be-
cause the e< tuipinent \\·ould have to be replaced ,,·hen 
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·a d " \vorn out. ·These two items alone, not cons1 ere an ex-
pense" by plaintiff on his break even theory, ,, ... ould 
exceed $10,000.00 per year. Such an assured loss wouldn't 
be too appealing to a reasonable investor. 
In this financial condition, plaintiff was finally told 
by Arctic Circle that he would have to do something to 
bring current the delinquent payments on the conditional 
sales contract or they would have to take steps to pro-
tect themselves ( T·. 35). Arctic Circle had actually as-
signed the proceeds receivable unde-r the contract to the 
bank, and the bank was pressing for payment or it might 
exercise the "recourse'' provision of the assignment and 
make Arctic ·Circle buy hack the contract ('T. 470-72). 
But plaintiff couldn't do anything, since he would have 
to make such payments out of capital rather than drive-
in receipts, and he testified that he had no operating 
capital: 
" ... I have testified that I was out of operating 
capital, and any payments 1nade to the bank would 
have to come out of operating capital.'' ( T. 520) 
To make matters \Yorse, plaintiff on August 13 \Yas 
heading into the fall and \\.,.inter months, "Then business 
\Vould be Pven worse. 
(b) Discussion of August 13, 1962: 
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F,inancialJ~r deprP~~Pd and e1nbarrassed and con-
<'PrnP<l berau~e . \ l'etic CirelP had annonn('Pd it "~a~ going 
to takP ~tPps to prot('et itself, plaintiff called defendant 
on th(' telephone at about 1 p.In. on .. Augu~t 13, 1962 and 
~ai(i that he \rantPd to talk to defendant (T. 3-l-). })('fend-
ant drov(' front his horne do\vn to the drive-in, "~here 
plaintiff djscussed his financial condition. Plaintiff said 
that he had bPen put on noticP by Arctic CirrlP that it 
\\rould havP to take st('ps to protPrt itsPlf, although he 
had not been gi YPn any di rPet notiC'e of repossession ( T. 
;L-l-:{S, ;);~:2). Plaintiff did say that he could not do any-
thing about it, and that the 111attPr \Yas out of his hands 
cr. ~:~-t-:)S). Plaintiff tried to get defendant to take back 
the bu~inPss and run it himself, sinrP then defendant 
,,·onld not havP to pay rent to himself and he 1night be 
a hlP to 1nakP it; although shortly thereafter plaintiff 
rontradjcted his VPl'Y O\Vn testin1ony and said that abso-
lutely nothing \vas said about defendant taking over the 
huRiness: 
·· ... I thought, possibly, the fact that he owned 
the propPrty, that he \\·ould be interested for the 
fact that he could take over and possibly have a 
1nore ~uecessful operation because of the rent 
that he \vouldn 't have to pay. He let me kno\\· im-
nlediately, that he absolutely \vasn't interested in 
taking oyer any operation of any type of food 
hn~inP~~. \Vhatsoeyer. I explored the-I explored 
the possibility that he had somebody in mind, pos-
sibly a relative or sornebody that he \vould possibly 
be interested in setting up in· business, and, of 
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course he wasn't. I then talked or tried to ap-
proach and discuss the possibilities of re-writing 
a new lease with Mr. Platt (defendant) based on a 
percentage of sales ... Mr. Platt told me that he 
couldn't re-write the lease; that, if he didn't get 
that $625 right exactly when it was due, he would 
go broke; he would go 'down the drain.' " ('T. 36) 
Despite this testimony, a fe\v minutes later plaintiff 
testified in shocking contradiction of himse If: 
Question: (By Mr. McMurray) Was there any-
thing in this conversation relative to your 
terminating the business at that point and 
Mr. Platt taking it over; that is, your sur-
rendering the property and I\f r. Platt taking 
it over~ 
Answer: Absolutely not. (T. 38) 
Another aspect of this conversation \Yhich is diffi-
cult to understand, strictly in light of plaintiff's testi-
mony, is his claim that his primary reason for calling 
defendant was to tell defendant not to rely on receiving 
the leasP rental payments: 
Question: (By Mr. McMurray) Would You tell 
the court the substanrP of that conve~sation ~ 
Ans,ver: Yes, sir ;~Jr. Platt arrived at the driYe-
in, and I told him that I understood that he 
was getting ready to build an office buildin~ 
and that I only thought he should kno\\~ ;t 
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"·hat point the drive-in 'va~ at, bPeause I 
thought that I had an obligation to hi1n of 
not l<·tt ing- hi1n stic-k out his neck on an office 
building if hP "·as to do any part of the fi-
nancing fron1 the sueePss of the driYP-in. (T. 
'J ... ) 
,);) 
DespitP this avo,ved pr11nary purpose of 'varn1ng 
dPI'Pndant not to do anything in reliance on receiving 
thP IPa~e rental }H1~·tnPnts from the driYP-in, plaintiff 
thPn tP~tified onl~· t\\ro pages latPr in thP record that he 
"ranted to assnrP dPfendant that, whatever happened, 
the lPasP rental pa~·1nents "·onld hP made: 
H ••• at this point I assured ~Ir. Platt one of the 
reasons I called him down was that I did not-
I told hi1n didn't want anything to happen that 
'vould get hin1 excited and have hi1n take moves 
that "'"Pre not c.alled for, that might possibly force 
1ne into bankruptr~· against 1ny will; and assured 
hun that, regardless of "·hat happened in relation 
to Ed\\rards, his rent "\Vould be paid; his rent 
'Yould be paid, regardless." ( T.37) 
Defendant "'"as understandably confu~Pd and con-
rern(•d after this conversation. If plaintiff's testimony 
ran be belieYPd, and 'YP assume throughout this brief 
that PYPry "·ord plaintiff said in his testimony is true 
(ho,Yever contradictory one part may be "·ith another), 
thr·n the purpose of the conversation 'vas for plaintiff 
to tell defendant (1) not to stiek his neck out in reliance 
on the lea~t· pay1nent~, heeau~e .. A.rctir Circ.le "·as going 
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"to take some type of steps to protect themselves" (T. 
35), and ( 2) not to get excited, because everything would 
be fine and, come \Yhat may, defendant could always rely 
on the rental payments (T. 37). 
(c) The "lockout" on the morn1ng of August 14, 
1962. 
After defendant and plaintiff finished their conver-
sation of August 13, defendant talked with his attorney 
(George Searle) and expressed a fear that Arctic Circle 
might re-possess from plaintiff equipment ,,~hich had 
been built-in at the drive-in and damage the building, and 
his attorney advised hin1 of his right under "·Clause 8" 
of the lease, and said that defendant would have to take 
steps to protect himself (T. 654, 49). Defendant \\Tarried 
about this, and at about 7 a.m. on August 14 he and his 
\vife went down to the drive-in ('T. G5-t ). She drove a 
passenger car and he drove a "camper" so that he could 
park it close to the door of the drive-in to prevent re-
moval of equipment, and he or his children could stay 
day and night in the camper to prevent a midnight re-
possession by Arctic Circle ( T. 658). Defendant called 
plaintiff on the telephone shortly after 7 a.m., and plain-
tiff's daughter ans\\TerPd, saying that her father had 
h_}ft for the University of l;tah and that her mother \Yas 
still asleep ( T. 654). DefPndant then \\TPn t do\vn I-Iigh-
land Drive a short distanee to l\fulholland's Lumber 
(\\'"hen thP~,. opened ahout R a.In.) and hought three lorks 
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and pnt th('tn on thP threP doors of thP drivP-in to ~<'eUrP 
th<' prPtnisPs (rr·-,_ ();>;>). (Co1npare this uncontroverted 
tPstitnon~· \Yith the eourt's finding that the lock-out was 
.. d~trin,rl lhl' ui,rJllftiJJie or Parly 1norning"- Finding Xo. 
~ • .... ·lrJn·a. I>laintiff had all<'g·<'d it \Ya~ during the night, 
hut not onP iota of evideneP ~upported that allegation. It 
is highl~· qnPHtionahle as to \\·h~· th<' phrase of ""during 
thP nighttinu'" appParPd in th<' finding.) H<' then called 
plaintiff's n'sidPtH·<' again (about 8:30a.m.) and talked to 
plninti rr·s "·ife, advising her of \\·hat he had don<' (T. 
(i:l:l). ~he said that elosing thP drivP-in \Yas "\\'"onderful," 
HhP \Vould eall the ernplo~·<'<'~ of the drive-in and tPll them 
about it, and that she \\·ould also call plaintiff and tell 
hin1 ( T. (););>). ~lH' did call plaintiff and told him of 
hPr eonvPrsation \\·ith defendant ( T. 39). Corn pare this 
,,,.ith the courfs \\'"holly erroneous finding that the ~·help" 
fro1n th<' drivP-in railed plaintiff (Finding No. 8, quoted 
in full, s11pra.) 
Plaintiff thPreupon drove to the drive-in, arriving 
therP so1ne ti1ne around 10 :00 a.1n. ('T. 38). Plaintiff in-
quirPd n~ to \Yhat had happened, and defendant advised 
hin1 that the plac<' had been closl~d to prevent removal 
of Pquipn1ent or supplies fro1n the drive-in (T. 40, 656). 
Plaintiff ~ugge~ted that defendant open the place for 
bn~ine~s. and they could atten1pt to 'vork out adjustments 
latPr ( T. 40). DPfendant said no, because the rental pay-
Juents due hin1 \\,.ere delinquent and he 'vas afraid Arctic 
Circle \\,.oul(l rP-possP~s equipment from plaintiff and 
dantn.!..!.·,~ the huilding. and that he had talked to his at-
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torney about the matter, and that no one was going into 
the building (not even defendant, himself) until the court 
determined \Yho was entitled to what (T. 40-41). Defend-
ant said he \vas enforcing "·Clause 8" of the lease agrPP-
Inent ( T. 49). Clause 8 of the lease reads as follo\YS: 
It is further agreed between the parties here-
to that if default be made in the payment of the 
rent above reserved, or any part thereof, or if any 
of the covenants and agreements herein con-
tained to be kept by the Lessee, it shall be lawful 
for the Lessor, his heirs or assigns, at any time 
thereafter at their election, and \vithout notice to 
declare said term ended, and to re-enter said de-
mised premises or any part thereof, either "~ith 
or without process of law, and to expel or re-
move or put out the Lessee or any person or 
persons occupying the said premises, using such 
force as may be necessary to do so, the same to be 
\vithout prejudice as to remedies "Thich 1night 
other\\Tise be available for arrears of rent or any 
breach of covenant, or agree1nent, and Lessor 
shall at all times have a valid first lien for rent 
due upon all property of Lessee, "Thether exempt 
by la\v or not, as security for the payment of the 
rent her<>in reserved. (Exhibit P-1) 
Plaintiff asked if he could go in the building and 
get his payroll records, and defendant said no, beeause 
no one \\ras going into the building (T. -bl). Plaintiff asked 
il' he could n~n1ove the peri~hable ite1ns, and defendant 
said no, hPeau~e no one \\Tas going in thP building until 
thP eon rt deeided thP 1natter ( T. 40). Plaintiff then 
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a~kP<l if hP eonld ~o in the building and nsP the phone 
to eall thP ··help'' and tPll the1n not to come to \Vork, and 
dP fen dan t said no, hPrau~P no one at all \\~as going 
into thP building until things 'YPre straightened out, but 
that if plaintiff \YantPd to 1nake a call there \\~a~ a pay 
phonP and dPfPndant offerPd plaintiff a dime to 1nake a 
eall ( T. -t-:~--t-4). Plaintiff took this as an insult, and left 
( 11 • -t-4). 
(d) Plaintiff's assignment of all his int(lrPst nPar 
noon of .:\ n~nst 14, 1 ~)():2. 
1\fter plaintiff left the drive-in, he talked 'vith his 
attornPy (II O\Yard Jones) about his legal position, and 
then \\'Pnt to Arctic Ci relP and told Ralph D. Edwards, 
an officer in the corporation, about the events of the 
1norning and about his discussion with his attorney ( T. 
411-1:2, 57:2-7-!). Ralph Ed\\~ards said that he didn't like 
thP legal adYicP that l\I r. Jones had giYt)n to plaintiff, and 
suggested that plaintiff go \\'"ith him to the la'v office of 
,,~ilford nL Burton, "~hirh thPy did (T. 412). l\Ir. Burton 
\\~as the attorney for .. A.rctic ·Circle on a regular retainer 
basis, and the pri1nary concern of Arctic Circle was to 
\York out so1nething to secure the presently unsecured 
open account debt of $15,000.00 which plaintiff owed 
(T. 142, 420). 
~Ir. Burton advised plaintiff and Ed,vards that he 
thought perhap~ defendant had made a conversion of 
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plaintiff's property, but that to n1ake sure there ''Ta.s a 
conversion, he would prepare some papers and they could 
go back to the drive-in that day and make a clear demand 
in the name of Arctic for the equipment and supplies, 
and if they '""ere delivered it would be alright because 
they would have what they wanted, and if they 'vere not 
delivered, then the defendant would have converted them 
(T. 736-38). Mr. Burton thus proceeded to prepare three 
documents to accomplish this, all of 'vhieh are in evidence 
as part of Exhibit 5-P. 
The first document, entitled "Assignment", is ex-
Pcuted by plaintiff and his 'vife for acknowledged con-
sideration, and it purports to: 
" ... assign, convey and sell to ARCTI~c· C'IR-
CLE, INC. all of the merchandise and inventory 
and all equipment not covered by conditional sales 
contracts located in the premises on Highland 
Drive and Gunn Avenue ... '' (emphasis add~d) 
The second document, entitled "Agreen1ent,'~ is ex-
ecuted by Ralph D. Edwards for Arctic Circle, Inc., and 
by plaintiff and his ",.ife. This document 'Yas made for 
the purpose of expressing "the understanding of the 
parties as to the manner in ",.hich said assignment shall 
operate." So the seeond doclnnent "Ta8 to explain the 
first, and said second docu1nent provides O"enerallv that 
b •· 
"thP assignment ve~ts title and o'Ynership absolutely in 
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~\rctic of all itPins coining \vithin the terms of the as-
signtnenr· and that .1\ retic "'ould proceed to bring an 
:u·tion to rP<'over ~ueh itPms fron1 defendant and then 
di~po~P of the1n a11<l eredit the procePds to the account 
plaintiff owed to Arctic-.. Arctic could do this in its solP 
di~<·n·tion, and \\'ithout notice to plaintiff, and Arctic, 
it~Plf, <·ould hP th<· buyPr of such items if it so desired. 
'rhis doetnnent did not cover the equipment sold under 
<'onditional sales contract to plaintiff hy Arctic, but it 
<lo(•s r~eite that: 
Hit is understood that Arctic "~ill be recover-
ing and taking possession of the equipment at 
said location ",.hich has been sold to Peterson 
(plaintiff) hy Arctic on conditional sales con-
traet.'' (Ex. 5-P'(B) ). 
The third doetunent prepared by ~lr. Burton is also 
<•xPeuted b<•t\\'<'Pn Aretic ·Circle and plaintiff and his 
\Vife, and aftPr rflciting ackno\\'ledged consideration, says 
that plaintiff: 
••. . . has hereby conveyed and assigned to Arctic 
all claims, rights, causes of action of every kind 
and desription \\'"hich Peterson (plaintiff) has now 
or may hereafter have against ,J. Lo\vell Platt 
(d~fendant) ... "(Ex. 5-P (C). 
(e) ·ConYersation on afternoon of August 1-!, 1962. 
Having made the assignment of plaintiff's interest, 
plaintifi' in the con1pany of Don ·C. Ed\\,.ards and Ralph 
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Edwards (Arctic Circle officers) went to the drive-in 
(T. 5·2). DPfendant was not there, but there were t'vo 
hoys in the camper which was parked near the building, 
and, upon request, one of the boys called defendant, and 
defendant arrived about twenty minutes latf-'r (T. 51-52). 
Plaintiff introduced defendant to the two Edwards, and 
then announced that he had sold and assigned everything 
to Arctic 'Circle (T. 52-55, 80-81). Defendant told him 
that he couldn't do that because he didn't have a right to 
do it (T. 53). At this point Ralph Edwards, for Arctic 
Circle, made the formal demand suggested by Attorney 
Burton, and that demand is quoted by plaintiff as follo,vs: 
". . . Ralph Edwards turned to ~Ir. Platt (de-
fendant) and says, 'I am Ralph Edwards of Arctic 
Circle, and I make demand of you to unlock this 
building so we can get in, take inventory, and 
remove our equipment.' "('T. 53) 
Defendant responded that ~'Nobody is getting into 
that building 'vithout a court order until a lot of ques-
tions are ans,vered." ('T. 53). Don Ed\\~ards then sug-
gested that they \Yeren't getting any\\There, and said 
"Let's get away from here," and they left ( T·. 53). Even 
though plaintiff and the Ed\\rards advised defendant that 
everything plaintiff 0\\7ned had been assigned to Arctic 
Circle, they did not sho,y· defendant any documents and 
did not have any \\""ith the1n ~ in fact, AttorneY Burton 
testified that the docun1ents probably \Vere signed on 
August 15 even though he dated the1n August 1-t- (T. 
721). 
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( t') .\ rrtie (~irrlP a~ a~~ignPe sought repos~P~sion. 
Shortly after .. August 15 .. \retic 'CirclP, through .r\t-
t oriH'Y Burton, brought suit for rPpossession of th~ 
PquiptnPnt in the drivP-in, took a d~fault judginent agaist 
d~\fPndant, and during thP first \\'PPk in October \\·PrP out 
at the drivP-in \\·ith HhPriff Ilarr:· HollPy trying to get 
in the building "Then defPndant happenPd to drivP hy and 
s< <' t hPnl ("r. Gfi:l-6G). De fPndant asked what they were 
doing and l\f r. Jlollp:· told hin1 thPy had a court order for 
tlH\ Pquiptn<'nt, and defendant asked for time to call 
.. \ ttornp~· Phil HansPn to sPe 'vhat could be done ( T. 
(}(j()-()S). T'o sunnnarizP subsequent events, part of the 
Pquiptnent \vas later retnoved by Arctic Circle and then 
l'P-insta.lled \\·h<'n defendant agreed to buy, and did buy, 
it frotn that corporation for $25,000.00 ( T·. G68- 69') .. He 
\\"a~ then told that hP could buy the inYPntory for $3,000.00 
and if he djd~ this \\·ould help out plaintiff's finaneial 
po~ition: 
Platt: H ••• they \\·ere putting the equipment back 
into the building, and l\1r. Burton and Mr. Don 
Ed,,·ards and Ralph Ed,vards had discussed Mr. 
Peterson's (plaintiff) proble1ns in front of me, and 
,,·antPd to know'" if I "\vould buy thP inventory that 
"·as in there. ThPy had no"\v sold me their equip-
Inent there, but not their inventory. And they 
~aid, ~\,"ill you buy the inventory in there~ And 
I ~aid "'\"hat is it 'vorth J? And ~fr. Burton told 
Ine that there 'vas $3,000 inventory in the building: 
and I said · Hov.r do you kno"\v that~' And he said, 
.,\,.Pll. ~[r. Peterson had records; therP is $3,000 
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worth of inventory in there.' And I said, 'Well, 
I'm not going to fight with you guys any longer; 
I will buy the inventory.' ( T·. 671) 
Defendant then testified that he made a careful in-
ventory of the items, with the assistance of his secretary 
(a former employee of plaintiff who was familiar with 
the items) and the actual value was only $1169.00 (T. 
672). D-efendant then told Mr. Burton and plaintiff that: 
~' .... I wasn't going to pay $3,000.00 for a $1,000.00 
inventory, that I had agreed to buy the inventory 
from them, but I wasn't going to pay $3,000 when 
it ,,,.as a $1,000 inventory." (T. 672). 
Defendant then asked plaintiff why he had said it 
\\ras a $3,000 inventory, and plaintiff said he estimated 
\Yhat it was (T. 672), and defendant then asked plaintiff 
to please go over the inventory "piece by piece" and 
plaintiff said "I can't; I got to be in school." ( T. 672) .. 
Defendant then simply refused to buy the inventory for 
$3,000 ('T. 672). Attorney Burton then prepared a paper 
for defendant to sign, which "~as signed by defendant as 
"~Pll as plaintiff and his vYife, and 'Yhich was introduced 
into evidenre as Exhibt 5-P (D). ~Ir. Burton recited in 
thP document that the inventory settlen1ent "~as •'re-
~einded as bet"~een the Petersons and Platt by reason of 
thP breach of Platt" and that Hall partie~ interested and 
eonrPrned "rith this action are restored to their original 
position prior to the Octoher R, 1962, Rettlement Agree-
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tHPnt ••. and all right~ eoncernPd thPrP\\·i.th ar<' reserv-
Pd and arP unaffPetPd and available to the parties con-
<•tlrnPd:· ( ~jxhihit 5-I>( D)). As a result of this agreeinent, 
plaintiff and defendant \VPrP n~stored to \\·hatPvPr posi-
tion tlu~y \VPI'P in prior to ()etober 8, 1962, and the nego-
tiation for the purchase of the inventory supplies for 
$;),000.00 had ahsolutPl! .. no legal forrP or effect. 
(g) ThPrP \\·as no art of conversion on the morning 
~ \ ll,i!'\lSt 1-t., 19()~ 
DPfe:udant's conduet in locking the building on the 
1norning of August ] 4, or his subsequent conversation 
that forenoon \\·ith plaintiff, did not constitute a con-
v<~rsion. First of all, defendant had a contractual right 
under the leasP to resume possession if there was a de-
fault in the payntent of rent, and plaintiff admittedly \\'"as 
$1.~:-lO.OO in arrears. (1T. 536). Secondly, defendant had 
a lien. pursuant to the leasP, on all property of every kind 
\Vhirh plaintiff o\\·ned or had an O\Ynership interest in, 
and \\·hirh "·as located in the building (Ex. 1-P, T. 536). 
Defendant therefore had a legal right to do what he did. 
Perhaps the situation would havP been different if de-
fendant had atten1pted to enforce the lease provision and 
plaintiff had forcefully resisted, in \\'"hich event defend-
ant 1ni~ht haYP been eompelled to exercise Clause 8 
through court proceedings. But that \vas not the situa-
tion, since the lockout \Vas aimed primarily at Arrtir, 
and plaintiff \vas in fact relieved of the burden of con-
tinuint!· to operate a losing business. Even if it could 
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be contended that in some circu1nstances defendant's 
conduct would have amounted to a conversion, plaintiff's 
execution of the lease giving defendant the express right 
to do exactly what he did would be an effective estoppel 
against plaintiff's claim that the exercise of a contractual 
right \vas a conversion. Also, plaintiff at no time tendered 
to defendant the $1,250.00 in delinquent rentals, perhaps 
because he simply had no 1noney \vith \vhich to do so 
(T. 520). 
(h) ThPre was no act of conversion on thP aft(Jr-
noon of August 14, 1962. 
There could have been no conversion on the afternoon 
of August 14 \vhen plaintiff and the Ed\vards from Arctic 
Circle visited the drive-in pre1nises. Arctic, as assignee 
of plaintiff, did not tender plaintiff's delinquent lease 
payments. All of the reasons set forth above would apply 
to Arctic as well as to plaintiff, since Arctic as the as-
signee of plaintiff stood in the san1e position as plaintiff. 
But, rnore basic still, any conversion, if one existed, on 
the afternoon of August 14 of necessity "Tould have been 
against Arctic Circle, since it \Vas then the sole claimant 
of thP equipment and inventory. Since Arctic 'Circle is not 
a party and since it in fact has fully settled its claims 
\Yith defendant, it is entirPly n1oot to speculate "Thether 
Arctie might have had a cause of action for conversion. 
Certainly plaintiff, having assigned and sold PYPrything, 
and having stated the sa111n to defendant, on th<? after-
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noon of l\ U!-,1 lst 1~, and tlu~ Ed,,·ards having represPnted 
thP :-;arnP, and having den1anded delivery, could have no 
rt·InotP eln.i1n for a eonvPrsion of something to \Vhich he 
elaitnPd no right, possessory or other\vise. It \Yill be re-
IHPtnht·rPd that ~\ttornPy Burton planned to establish 
a ronvPrsion in favor of An·tic by the visit in thP aftPr-
noon of 1\ ugust 14, and he apparently thought that he 
hnd, hut that 1natter has been full~· sPttlerl. 
( i) I~~ven if thPrP had been a conversion against 
plaintiff on the 1norning of August 14, plaintiff did not 
trPat it as surh. 
Let us assulnP, arguendo, that defendant's conduct in 
loeking the building on the 1norning of August 1-l-, coupled 
\\yith his diseussion \\·ith plaintiff on that 1norning, 
runonnted to a conversion of plaintiff's personal property. 
If so, plaintiff could havP assPrted his cause of action 
I' or drunages based on the conversion. Did he do that~ 
CPrtainly not. HP still elai1ned o\\~nership, as demon-
~trated h~· his assignn1ent and sale of his O\Ynership and 
rights to ~\retic 'Cirrle, under an agreement that Arctir 
Cirrlt• \Vould assert such o\vnership and \Yould bring 
.. art ion as 1nay be necessary to recover possession of 
said assigned property'' and \vith the clear cut pro-
nonnreinent that the assign1nent "vests title and O\vner-
ship absolutely in .A .. rrtic of all items coming \\·ithin the 
tPnn:-; of the assignn1ent." (Ex. :S-P(B). At this point 
.A. rrtir O\Ynerl Pverything- that plaintiff had o\vned earlier 
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that morning, plus the additional position as vendor 
under the condition sales contract on certain of the 
equipment. What did Arctic do on the afternoon of Aug-
ust 14, after receiving the assignment~ It went directly 
to the drive-in and asserted ownership of the items in 
question, demanded possession, and was refused. This 
conduct certainly shows that plaintiff never elected to 
treat defendant's conduct during the morning of August 
14 as a conversion, but he sold his ownership by an as-
signment, and the assignee (Arctic) then proceeded in 
October to take possession and remove much of the equip-
ment, subsequently selling it to defendant and re-install-
ing it ( T. 668-69). Whether one wishes to characterize 
plaintiff's conduct as an election of remedies, or estoppel, 
or whatever, it is clear that if he ever had a cause of 
action for conversion, his subsequent and conveyances 
~ffectively extinguished such cause of action. A contin-
ued claim of ownership, after a conversion, al\Yays de-
feats a cause of action based on conversion. See 89 Corpus 
Juris Secundum, T'rover & Conversion, Section 88; 
Johnston v. Cincinnati Ry. Co., 146 Tenn. 135, 240 S.W. 
429; Stout v. Ftttltz, 117 1\Io. A pp. 573, 93 S. \\T. 919 ; Bell 
r. Cu1nmings, 3 Tenn. 275; Weakley v. Evans, 46 S.\\T. 
1070 (1Tenn.); Scott v. Patterson, 1 Dom. L. R. 783 ( Sask. 
] 923). 
It is important to note that Arctic never purported 
to make any re-assignment or re-conYPyance to plaintiff. 
The agreement bet\\'"PPn plaintiff and defendant \vhich 
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l'P~torPd th~1n to thPir rfl~PP('tive legal po~itions a~ of 
()<'tohPr s. 19(;~ (J~~x. ;>-P(D)) <'Prtainl~· did nothing more 
than <'Xa<'tly ''"hat it ~aid, 'i.e., put the1n in their re~pectivP 
po~it ion~ a~ of that datP. But, as of that date plaintiff 
had al rvad~· a~~ignPd evPrything to 1\retie undPr his 
<'lnitn o\\·nership in 1naking ~neh assignmflnt, and plain-
t i l'f continued in this po:;;ition right down to, during, 
and after OrtohPr 8, 1 ~Hi~. 
l~nder ~otnP n<'hulous eirf'uit~·, plaintiff's roun~Pl 
~PPlll~ to think that thP present action can be founded on 
~oinP 1n~·~tical right that plaintiff somehow retained, 
dP~pite the a:;;signment and despite hi~ rlai1n of o'vner-
~hip a~ a ha~i~ for the assignment, and 'vithout any rP-
a~~igninPnt fron1 1\ r<'tie to plaintiff. (Of course any such 
purportPd r<'-as~igninent, even if one had Pxi ~ted, would 
hP \\·holly nlPaninglt'~~. because .A retie fully settled all 
of its rlai1ns again~t defendant and eertainly had nothing 
to re-a~~ig-n.) Plaintiff's counsel seems to beliPYP that 
the agreeinPnt bet,veen Arctic and plaintiff, dated August 
1-t. and part of the package of three instruments ( includ-
ing th(' assign1nent) carrying the same date, is of some 
nelp to plaintiff'~ cause. That instrun1ent does say that: 
·· ... Peterson ha~ hereby conveyed and assign-
ed Arctic all clai1ns, rights, causes of action of 
PYery kind and description 'Yhich Peterson 
(plaintiff) ha~ no'Y or 1nay hereafter have against 
J. Lo,vell Platt (defendant) . . . in any manner 
pertaining to. connected 'Yith or arising out of 
the Lease Agreement entered into . . . and par-
tirnlari~~ roneerned "Tith the forcible entry and 
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the eviction of Peterson from said premises by 
said Plat ... on or about August 14 ,1962 ... 
Arctic is permitted to cause the action, if any 
is brought, to be brought in the name of P'eter-
son, or may bring such cause in the name of 
Arctic as it in its sole discretion may determine 
. . . It is further understood and agreed that 
Arctic will diligently proceed to effect a settle-
ment of said cause of action against Platt . . . 
or will cause legal action to be brought and dili-
gently prosecute the same to judgment, said 
action to be commenced "rithin sixty days ... " 
(Ex. 5-P(C) ). 
Plaintiff's reasoning, as close as we can get it, 
goes something like this: Plaintiff may assign every-
thing he has to Arctic on August 14, including his o'vner-
ship in any and every item, and including any cause of 
action he rnight have, with the right in Arctic to bring 
suit either in the name of Arctic or plaintiff; then, both 
plaintiff and Arctic may tell defendant that Arctic has 
succeeded to everything plaintiff had; then, Arctic may 
HPll the items to defPndant, and fully settle all of its 
f'laims, all the \vhile defendant believing that _A __ rctic has 
succeeded to evc~rything plaintiff had claime.d; then, an 
agreement may be executed (Ex. 5-P(D)), saying that 
plaintiff and defendant still have their rights against 
each other as of just prior to October 8, 1962 (\vhen plain-
tiff had no rights, for thPy had been assigned) ; then 
Arctic can sue defendant again (this action), in the name 
of p·etPrson, hy virtue of the agrPeinent dated .L-\.ug. 1± 
(~x. fi-P(~C)) and ean c-lai1n a cause of action by virtue-
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ot' thP ag-n~PtnPnt datPd XovPinber 1:2, l!Hi:2 (Ex. 5-P(D)) 
\vhieh rt~storPs rights as of just prior to ()ctober 8. 
CounsPl for dPfPndant \\·as interP~ted in finding out 
l'ron1 jJ r. l~urton "·ltethPr the package of instruments 
datPd August 1-t rPall~· InPant "·l1at thPy said, or "·hethPr 
~lr. Burton had told thP elients that thPsP doctunents had 
~otnP hidden tneaning contrar~· to \\·hat they said. The 
trial rourt did not n~quirP ~I r. Burton to answer many of 
tiH·sP qtH~stions, hut he (~lr. Burton) did 1nakP it clear 
that . .:\ rrtie is tlu~ rPal part~· in intPrP~t in this action: 
Que~tion: (hy i\1 r. Hansen) Did you tell the1n 
that that first docmnent, \\·hich i~ refPrred to 
'" . :\" of 3-P a~~igned PVPrything they had in 
and to everything PXePpt the equip1nent noted 
in the conditional sales contract marked Ex-
hibit fi-P J? 
Jl R. ~I e 1\1 r·RR.A 't'": Objection a~ i1nmaterial. 
'rHE ( \)l .. RT: Ru~tained. 
Qlrl~~STIOX: Did you tell them that the second 
Entry UB" or the re1naining Entry HC" cov-
Pred equipment that 'vasn't covered in Entry 
...-\., or the remaining Entry in B or ,C, \\·hich-
ever the rase might be. 
:\[ R. ~I e :Jil '"RR.A Y: Objection as i1runaterial. 
'rHE C<)l~RT: Objection is sustained. 
(rr~:ESTIOX: It is a fact, isn't it, ~fr. Burton, 
that you told the Petersons that the docu-
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ments in "5-P'" marked A,B, and ~c, respec-
tively, being the first three entries ther~in, 
did not mean what the written word srud ~ 
MR. McMURRAY: Objection, immaterial; at-
tempt to vary the instrument by parol evi-
dence. 
THE c·ouRT: You may answer that one. 
ANSWER: The conversation concerning these 
instruments on the 15th with Mr. Jones pres-
ent was that there would be the action filed 
in behalf of Petersons for their rights under 
the forcible entry and the conversion; that 
there would be the separate a.ction filed for 
Arctic Circle for the recovery of the property. 
That, to protect me and to protect Arctic Cir-
cle and the Petersons, it was to be understood 
that, \vhatever was recovered in these t"To 
actions, I vvould be in the position of apply-
ing and settling the debtor creditor relation-
ship between Peterson and Arctic 'CirclP, and 
the balance "rould come over to the Pet~rsons. 
QUES:TION: And wasn't the balance, after the 
theoretical came over to the Petersons, didn't 
you discuss, at this time, that this would be 
credited to the Petersons, but actually paid 
to Arctic Circle because of the open account 
that the Petersons had "rith Arrtir Circle? 
ANSWER: No, I \vas to be in a position of tak-
ing whatever recovery I "ras to achiev(} for 
the Petersons on their cause of action~ and 
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apply it on any indebtedness that there \va~ 
\\·ith Arctie ·CirclP. After that was satisfied, 
any balaneP I \Vonld be in a position to pay 
ovPr to the PetPrRonR. 
Q t '"FjRTIOX: And, \\·hen you say the ·balancP 
thP Peterson'~ o\\·Pd Arctic (~ircle,' do you 
lin1it it to thP eonditional sales contract bal-
anee )~ 
;\NS'\rER: Any open account- any indebted-
TIP~~. (T. 7 -t~--t;~) 
13ut. \\·hatPVPr nl r. Burton's secret plan \\'"aS to Inain-
tain 1nultiple and duplieitous actions against defendant 
by a ya ri<)t~· of plaintiffs (or at least plaintiffs' names), 
nil for the henefi t of Arctic (~ircle, the fact re1nains that 
~nch plan \\'"as abortive. The la\v does not pPrmit false 
and 1nisleading ~tatements to be made to defendant as to 
\\Tho has thP property, elain1s and eauses of action, thus 
inducing defendant to buy, co1npromise and settle on 
that basi~, and then to have a surprise announcement that 
.\rctir reall~· didn't have the claim after al1, but plaintiff 
had it. and yPt plaintiff had to pay any proceeds reeeived 
to .. \retic. This could be 1nore confusing than trying to 
play Hbutton, button, "Tho'~ got the button,'' because you 
are playing it 'vith thou~ands of settlement dollars, as 
.. eansP of aetion, eause of aetion, \vho's got thP cause of 
action.'' 
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It is also interesting to note that the foregoing ex-
planation of l\fr. Burton (that he intended Peterson-
plaintiff-to bring the conversion action) really doesn't 
square at all with his testimony given a few pages earlier 
in the record, wherein he said that at the time the pack-
age of documents were being prepared he advised that 
Arctic should make the demand for delivery and, if re-
fused, Arctic would have the claim for conversion and it 
would be the cause of action of Arctic, arnd not Peterson. 
Mr. Burton made it clear that with the assignment he 
had devised, that Arctic could make a demand as to 
everything, including all of the property and inventory, 
and a refusal would give Arctic a very comprehensive 
claim for conversion arising and accruing directly to the 
corporation. Difficult as it is to believe, at least so far as 
it is diamentrically opposed to the above testimony of 
Mr. Burton, and equally opposed to the actual procedure 
followed by Arctic in this action through using the thin 
facade of plaintiff's name as the apparent party in inter-
est, we submit the follovving extract from the transcript 
of evidenre: 
QUES·TIO·N: (By Mr. Hansen) Isn't it a fact, 
Mr. Burton, that, during your conversation 
in this instance on the 14th of August, 1962 
in your office, with the presence of yourself 
and, at least, l\fr. Peterson and 1\Ir. Ralph 
Edvvards, that you told them-the Edvvards-
Ralph Edwards in this case-to say that Arc-
tic Circle owned all of the equipment and in-
ventory-fixtures in the building on the prem-
ise~~ 
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.\~H\Y'}~H: Ko, I told hin1 to 1nake a den1and, 
as th(' 0\\11Pr of all of the equi plnPnt and the 
inventor~,.· 
t~lTESrrl()X: \ .. ou did not tell them to make a 
dPlnand on ~lr. Platt for \vhat interest they 
might have had in P< tuipment they ,, .. Pre selling 
under a eonditional sales contract, only, did 
you~ 
AXS \YER: I have givPn you the convPrsation 
that I gave to the Ed\\ .. ards. 
Ql~I1~~TION: You didn't tPll them to tell nf r. 
Platt that there \\ .. as any security arrange-
Inent n1ade bet\veen the Petersons and the 
l~~d\\·ards did ~ .. on? 
..l:\ x~''T)~~R: I have given you the conversation. 
QUE,S'TIOX: Isn't it a fact, l\[r. Burton, that it 
\Yas the conversation and plan in your office 
that da~·, to have the Petersons and the Ed-
'va.rds go down and represent to the Platts 
that the Edwards owned everything, when in 
truth and fact, you, the Ed,vards, and Peter-
sons kne\\ .. very \\ .. ell the arrangement "·as 
1nerely one of security and not total transfer 
of interest~ J? 
~\.XS,,~ER: X o, the conversation, ~Ir. Hansen, 
\\ .. as that there had been-there "·as existing 
the problein of a seller and purchaser be-
t,veen Platt and Peterson-or, pardon me-
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between Arctic Circle and Peterson ; that 
there would be problems concerning the 
rights under the title-retaining contract 
where no notice for any default, if any ex-
isted, had been given by Arctic to the Peter-
sons. I didn't want to be concerned vYith that, 
that we weren't taking any steps to affect 
Mr. Peterson's causes of action, but that, when 
Arctic Circle made a demand-and I wanted 
them to make the demand for the return of 
all of the eq~tipment and the property, inven-
tory-from Mr. Platt-that they "\\ ... ere to go 
down and make a demand from Mr. Platt for 
the return of all of the equipment-all of the 
property including the inventory. 
QUESTIO·N: And this 'vas the plan that you ad-
vised because of the relationship that existed 
between the Petersons and the Arctic Circle 
on their conditional sales contract, isn't it f 
ANSWER: No-there is no plan-nothing dif-
ferent than I have indicated in my conver~a­
tion. 
QlJES:TION: Well, by the "plan," or the contents 
of your conversation-the reason 'Yas, wasn't 
it, Mr. Burton, because of the relationship 
bet,veen Arctic 1Circ1e and the P'etersons un-
der the terms of the conditional sales con-
tract~ 
ANS"\Y.ER: ThP reason 'vas that I 'Yanted to 
have a clear demand made, first, to determine 
if there "ras any "·ay-any basis upon "rhich a 
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~Ptt lPinent rould be effPrtPd ''"hen he ~a"· th<-
p(•oph_} Pntitled to thP equip1nent 'VPI'P therP 
dPinanding it, aurl then to have a clear con-
"'ersion if the den1and u·asn't 1net. 
(llTE~TION: You didn't advise them, did you, 
~I r. Burton, that the Arctic CirrlP had to 
proePPd through court to enforce their rights 
under the salPs contract, Exhibit 6-P, in this 
ras<' as it pertained to the PetPrsons, did yon? 
1\NS \\~I~~R: I told l\lr. Ed"rards, for the Arctic 
CirclP, that the acts of l\Ir. Platt, in my opin-
ion, alread~· evidenced an exercise of doinin-
ion over thP property, that ·zrou/.d cor~,~oditute 
a concersiou as far as ... 4rcfir Circle; b1tt, so 
there could be uo doubt, and if thPre was any 
opportunity to get this place opened, two 
things eould lH• accomplished-the de1na ud 
should be Jna.de; and, if that didn't give rights 
to thP opportunit~r to get this place opened 
and the problen1 solved, then they u·o1tld hare 
fhPir ronrPrsion estab!i.shed. 
Ql~I~STIOX: And this 'vas the demand you are 
talking- about-the demand that you thought 
"·a8 neeessary fron1 Aretir Circle to ~~ r. 
Platt, 'va~n 't it' 
.:\XE;,, ... ER: The deJnand for the ret'ltrn of the 
equipnzent zras for the assertion of thr rights 
of ... -lrctic Circle> so Platt knezr for sure that 
he u·as goin.r~ to be acco1tntable to Arctic Cir-
cle. 
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QUE·S·TION: You never instructed Mr. Peter-
son to make such a demand as to any possible 
conversion up, or from that time on, from 
::\fr. Platt toward the Petersons, did you~ 
ANS·WER: From the fa.cts-well, the answer to 
that is, I did not ask Peterson to make any 
further demands. 
QUEIS·TION: And isn't it a fact that the reason 
you didn't is because, as of the time Arctic 
Circle was to make the demand, it was your 
advice, wasn't it, that the Petersons repre-
sent to Mr. Platt, that, as of that time, they 
owned nothing as to inventory and equipment 
in the premises . . . 
ANSWER: I don't know how to answer your 
question. I have given you the conversation. 
QUE,STION: Excuse me-let me complete the 
question if I may-because they had assigned 
all of their interest to Arctic Circle~ 
ANSWER: I can't ans,ver that question, your 
Honor. I don't understand it. (T. 736-38). 
It is clear from the above testimony " ... hat the "plan" 
was, and it "\vas absolutely and co1npletely inconsistent 
with the prior excerpt quoted from the testi1nony of l\Ir. 
Burton at T. 7 42-3, 'vhere he said, that the plan ''"·as to 
have Peterson. suP for the conversiou and .. A.rctic sue 
sin1ply _for return o_f eqnipJnPnt on the title-retaining con-
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ditional ~alP~ contrac-t. In anr event, and def;pite the 
ahovP eonfu~ion, l)etf'r,~..o·ou and l!}d1rords carried out the 
plan 1rherehy they reJJresented to defendant that Arctic 
o11·ned Pl't'f,llfhiu,rJ. ineluding thP equipment and the in-
VPntory, and .Arctic JJiade the denuu1d in an atte1npt to 
P~tahl i~h a conversion as had been discussed in .JI r. 
TJurton·~ offieP, all of \vhieh is detailed above. It is 
itnportant, too, to rPtllPmber that, aftPr defendant \Va~ 
told that plaintiff had assigned evPrything; no one ever 
~nggested or hinted to defendant anything to the con-
trar~~ (T. ~69). 
(.i) ~ununar~~ of Point I. 
The artual facts upon \\"hich judgment was awarded 
to plaintiff are absolutPly shocking. r_rhis is true despite 
thP finding drafted by plaintiff's coun~Pl and signed hy 
the judge to the effert that: 
''The plaintiffs at no timP entered into collusion 
",.ith or cooperated \\,.ith any third party fron1 
"~hon1 thPy \vere purchasing any equipment or 
fixture~ in an atte1npt to harass the defendants or 
cause them to suffer any financial expense or loss. 
The plaintiffs at all times pertinent herein acted 
in good faith. (Finding K o. 1-t-, R. 91). 
The guilty runneth f The above finding cannot \vhite-
"·n~h ",.hat really happened. The true facts, as detailed 
herPtofore and ~ununarized belo,v, clear and uncontro-
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verted, as established essentially by plaintiff's p~wn 
testimony and that of Arctic Circle officers testifying 
for plaintiff (and themselves), are as follo,Ys : 
(1) Plaintiff, heavily indebted to Arctic Circle, was 
was locked out by defendant from certain drive-in prem-
ises being operated under a lease, because he was $1,-
250.00 in arrears in lease rentals, and because defendant 
feared damage from repossession by Arctic and, further, 
did not "rant to lose his lessor's lien until rights were 
judicially determined. 
( 2) Plaintiff immediately talked to Howard Jones, 
his attorney, and then to officers of Arctic Circle, 'vho 
advised him that the advice from his attorney didn't 
make sense, and that he should talk to Wilford :JI. Bur-
ton, the regularly retained attorney for Arctic 'Circle. 
(3) The admitted purpose in contacting Attorney 
Burton was to fully protect Arc6e ·CirclP, and only in-
eidentally· to protect plaintiff, if anything happened to 
he ]Pft over after Arctic ",.as satisfied. 
( 4) Mr. Burton prepared papers on ... A.ugust 1-!, 
1962, and they 'verP executPd, ",.hereby plaintiff assigned 
everything to Arctic, PYPn including all causes of action 
"'"hich he then had or ever "'"onld have. 
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{ ~>) I )p fPndant ,,·a~ told of this ron1pletP a~~ign­
tnPnt, by plaintiff as \\'Pll as by officers of .. A.retic ( 1 ircle 
and upon ndYieP frotn Attornp~· Burton. \YhilP both 
plaintiff and ..~.\ retie expected plaintiff to get something 
if Pnough \YPrP rPeovPred again~t dPfendant to morP 
than pa~· plaintiffs debts to Arctic, defendant \vas nPVPl' 
told of thi~. In fact, at all pPrtinent times, defendant \vas 
told that plaintiff had assigned PVPrything to . \ r<-tie. 
(()) Halph D. Ed,,·ards, officer of Aretir, tPstifird 
that dPfPndant ,,·as never told the truth, but in fact \\·as 
tnisl(~ad, about plaintiff having assigned his complete 
interP~t (T. 3()9). But this ronduct ,,·as as reco1nmended 
h~· .-\ ttornp~· Burton. 
( 7) AttornPy Burton tPstified, in contradiction to 
hitnself, as follo\\·s: 
(a) That he told Arctic officials and plaintiff 
to tell defendant that all of plaintiff's rights had been 
n~signed to Aretie; 
(b) That all of plaintiff's rights hadn't really 
been assigned to ... :\rrtir, but it \\'"as sort of a security 
arrangPiuent, and he (Burton) had authority to sue for 
£-\rctie in plaintiff's na1ne and give the 1noney to Arctic: 
(e) That \\·hen he prepared the assignment 
papers on ~\.ugu8t 1-!, he advised his clients that any action 
for conversion \vould strictly be a cause of action in favor 
of .. Arctic; and 
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(d) That when he prepared the assignment 
papers on August 14 he advised his clients that any 
action for conversion would strictly be cause of action 
in favor of plaintiff; 
(8) Arctic claimed ownership of everything plain-
tiff had owned, and even re-possessed and physically re-
moved much of the equipment; and then sold the same 
to defendant for $25,000.00, reserving only Peterson's 
(plaintiff's) rights, which 'vere explained to defendant 
to mean only that they did not want it to appear that 
Arctic was selling to defendant the franchise o'vned by 
plaintiff, although that instrument specifically reserved 
plaintiff's (not Arctic's) rights in the instant litigation: 
( 9) In this action the real property in interest is 
Arctic, since it will receive the money from any judgment 
collected. In this regard, please note that : 
(a) Arctic claims that it~ substanti~·e right 
arises under the assignment from plaintiff dated ... :\ugu~t 
l-l-,1962; 
(b) Arctic claims its procedural right to sue in 
plaintiff's name arises fron1 the agreement also dated 
Aug. 1-l-, 1962: 
(c) Arctic clai1ns that its complete settlement 
\Yith defendant subsequent to the August 14 assignment 
is im1naterial, bPeause a reservation of plaintiff's rights 
causPd the instanct eausP of action to survive. This, says 
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~\retie, is ~o lH'eau~P PYPn though Arrtic O\vned thP cause 
ol' aetion, it had speretly rPservPd the right to sue in 
I)t'tPr~on's (plaintiff'~) name, and this gimmick coupled 
"·it h tht· rPservat ion of PetPrson ·~ rights, is sufficient to 
1naintain the ]H"Psent ac-tion: 
(d) Arctic ~ays it it doesn't really mattPr that 
~\ rctic officials and plaintiff told defendant that plaintiff 
had rrsPrvPd nothing in the assignment, but had assigned 
PYPrything to Arrtir: and 
(e) Arctic claims that its determined claim of 
O\Vnership, and thP right to possession, as the assignee 
of plaintiff, fro In August 1 ~ for\Yard, even resulting in a 
partial repossession and a partial sale by Arctic, in no 
"?ay affeets the prior alleged conversion by defendant 
against plaintiff. 
NEED ANYTHING MORE BE SAID? 
POINT NO. II 
THERE IS NO BASIS FOR PUNITIVE OR MENTAL 
DISTrRBANCE DAMAGES. 
The trial court a\varded $1,000.00 as puntive dam-
age~ and $10.00 for mental disturbance. This is incredible! 
'fhe uncontrovPrted Pvidence, \\~hich the trial court 
thought justified these a""'"ards, viewed in the light 1nost 
favorable to plaintiff, is as follo\\ ... S: 
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Defendant didn't press and harrass plaintiff for the 
delinquent rental payments, even though they had been 
in arrears for some time (T. 33). When plaintiff told 
defendant on August 13 that he should not rely on the 
lease payments, and asked if defendant would please take 
back the place and operate it himself, defendant was not 
abusive, belligerent, threatening, offensive or menacing in 
any way (T. 34-38.) In the early morning of August 14 
(7 a.m.) when defendant decided to do something to 
protect his building from equipment repossessions by 
Arctic Circle, defendant called plaintiff before anything 
was done, but plaintiff had left and plaintiff's wife was 
asleep, and defendant could only talk to plaintiff's daugh-
ter (T. 654). Immediately after placing the locks on the 
building (at about 8 :30 a.m.) defendant again called 
plaintiff's residence and this time talked to plaintiff's 
'vife, requesting to get in touch with plaintiff, and she 
said that she "~ould notify the help before they ra1ue to 
\vork at 11 a.m. ('T. 655). Before defendant took any of 
this action, he had consulted "~ith George Searle, an at-
torney (1T. 654). When plaintiff came to the building 
after 9 a.m., defendant "~as not rude, threatening or 
impolite, hut he was firm in declaring that he had in-
voked Clause 8 of the lease and that no one "~ould go 
in the building, not even the defendant, himself, until the 
court decided what the rights of the parties were (T. 38-
44-). When plaintiff 'va.ntPd to make a telephone rall 
and defendant offered hi1n a dime, plaintiff interpreted 
this as an insult, got 1nad, and left ('T. 44). This ""'"as the 
1nost damaging evidPnee addncPd against defendant. That 
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at'tPrnoon, ho\veYPr, \vhen plaintiff returned \vith the 
1•:( hva rds (and \Yhen plaintiff no longer had any (•laim 
and \\~as not involvPd), defendant did appear to turn a 
littlP \vhitP \vhen hP heard plaintiff had assigned every-
thino· to . \ reti(' CirelP and thPY \VPrP there to demand ~ . 
dPiiYery, and defendant even used the \\~ord "drunn'' 
rathPr than darn.'' ('T. ~66). 
In truth and fact the \\'Tong party \vas awarded puni-
tiYP da1nages, for if any \\·ere justified, defendant should 
haYP been n\varded such damages against plaintiff. 
POINT III. 
PLAINTIFF'S EVIDENCE ON DAMAGES WAS IM-
PROPER. 
Brief 1nention should be made of the evidence pre-
sPnted by plaintiff to show the damages \\rhich resulted 
fron1 the conyersion. Plaintiff's \\'itnesses did not use 
the 1narket value test becausP they said that the second-
hand 1narket for the equip1nent in question \Vas very 
poor. and that the equip1nent had its highest value when 
it \\·as left \Yhere it "·as installed and used until it wore 
out ( T. 1 ~-!-:2~), 160, 185, 30-!, 3~1-:2:2, 3:29). In this regard, 
the \vitnPsses testified that they reached this value by 
thP eo~t less depreciation n1ethod, and since the equip-
tnent \\·as only t\\'"O yPars old, it practically had full value 
( T. 1:2-!-:29, 160, 185, 304, 3:21-:2:2, 329). It \\·as readily ad-
nlitted, that. if the equipment \vere to have been removed 
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and placed on the market, it would have brought less than 
one half of the amount actually testified to as the value, 
and which higher amount was accepted by the lo\ver 
court ( T .. 329'-30). 
Three observations are noteworthy in this regard: 
(a) Plaintiff's witnesses completely disregarded 
market value, simply because it was too ln,,~, ,,,.ithout 
showing any unique or personal value; 
(b) Plaintiff claimed this high value placed on 
Arctic 'Circle equipment could be realized only if the 
Pquipment \Vere to be left in the drive-in and utilized 
(in face of the fact that the business \Yas losing money, 
had impoverished plaintiff to the point "~here he had no 
capital left, and offered the same prospects for the fu-
ture). 'Thus, if plaintiff's successor in interest \vere to 
realize this same "unique value," as plaintiff had, in us-
ing the equipment in the pren1ises for the remainder 
of its depreciable life, such successor certainly \\'"ould 
have follo\ved plaintiff's path to insolvency; and 
(c) Plaintiff's theory of conversion \\.,.as based upon 
a demand for return and deliYery of his equip1nent, and 
the failure to so deliver alleged}~~ constituted a conver-
sion. H o\\~ consistent it is to argue that you are daln-
aged by not having your equip1nent returned and de-
livered to you, but that your measure of damagPs is "~hat 
the equip1nent \vould be \vorth if installed and kept in a 
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hypothetically profitahlP drive-in business, rather than 
\\'hat the PquipnlPnt \Yould have bePn worth if delivered 
to you as d<~tnandP<l and sold on the current market at 
th.- ht'st. prieP available? 
rl,hPl'< 1 \Y<lS flO PVideneP, thPrefore, that COUld have 
justified the court's award, even if a conversion could 
havP hP<'n found. The measurP of damage \\~as contrary 
to ht,,·, and \Vas dia1netrically opposed to plaintiff's theory 
of <·onv<~rsion rPsulting from a demand for delivery of 
thP Pquiplnent. ~PP 11! cCormick, Danzages, Sections 45, 
1 ·>·>_·>~) ..... ) ....,,_ . 
POINT IV. 
DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AGAINST 
PLAINTIFF FOR UNPAID LEASE RENTALS. 
Plaintiff clearly admitted that he "~as delinquent in 
thP slun of $1.~;)0.00 under the lease ( T. 229-30). Plain-
tiff had paid $1,:ZGO.OO \\~hen the lease was executed on 
.T nne 10, 1960, representing a prepayment of the rental 
for the last t\\~o n1onths of the ten year term (T. 20). It 
just so happened that plaintiff had become delinquent 
in an equivalent an1ount, but he admitted that there had 
nPv(~r been any discussion \vith defendant, or anyone else, 
about receiving credit for the $1,:250.00 prepayment to 
eure the $1,~;)0.00 delinquency ( T·. 241). Plaintiff knew 
he had to catch that rent up, and intended to do so as soon 
as hP could, admitting that if defendant sought judgment 
for the $1.2;10.00 arrearage, it would be justified, and 
p1aintiff "~ould not contest it (T. 240). 
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The trial judge reasoned, strangely enough, that 
rentals paid after the delinquency could not be credited 
to the unpaid rentals for earlier months, but legally could 
be credited only to current rentals (despite the fact that 
the lessor had never consented to such a credit of the 
rentals). The judge thus determined that plaintiff on 
August 14, 1962 had actually pre-paid his rent to Aug-
ust 23, and had nine days left before he was obligated 
to make any further payments. Anomalous though it is, 
the court found as a fact that a delinquency for prior 
rentals could in no \Vay result in a current delinquency 
if the rent for the current month had been paid. (See,. 
generally, Finding No. 6, R. 89). 
Under the trial court's ruling, it is clear that a tenant 
could fail to pay the required monthly rentals for three 
years, and then pay only one month's rental, and this 
payment would have to be credited to the current n1onth 
(regardless of the wishes of the lessor), and the tenant 
,,~ould thus be absolutely current in his rent-even though 
he still o\ved unpaid rentals for three years. \Y-hether the 
trial judge's rationale is uncomprehendingly perceptive, 
imperceptively incisive, or sophisticatedly obtuse, the 
plain fact is that there is on legal authority to support 
it. On the contrary, legal authority is dia1netrically op-
posed: 32 Am. Jur., Landlord & Tenant, Section 853; 
52 Corp1rs Juris Secundum, Landlord & Tenant Section 
' 
473 (f); Borlaw 'l:. Hoffnla.n, 103 Colo. 2SG, 86 Pac. 2d 
239 (1938): and Wellbrock r. Duffy, 158 Atl.. 377 (N.J. 
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1 D:t~). Tht' judge not only ignored the law; he ignored 
thP plain ,,·ording of the contrar.t (Ex. 1-P·). 
'rhe eourt's a\\·ard of $181.-l-H for the pro-rata refund 
ot' rent fro1n j\_ug. 1.-! to Aug. 23 should be reversed, and 
dPt'endant should be a\varded judgment on his counter-
l'lai rn for thP uncontroverted arrearage of $1 ,2fl0.00. 
CONCLUSION 
If defendant \\·Pre to emphasize one critical fact, 
above all othPr~, "·hich would clearly entitle defendant 
to a co1nplete revPrsal of the judgment of the lower court, 
it \\·ould be this: P'laintiff, after the alleged conversion, 
eontinued to elaim o\\·nership of the property by assign-
ing the same and purporting to pass title to the assignee; 
and the assignee, standing in the shoes of the assignor, 
eontinued to ass~rt title and o"·nership based upon the 
a~~ignnlPnt, actually repossessing and selling the prop-
Prty. T·his fact nt?eessarily raises this query: How could 
plaintiff clai1n that defendant's conduct constituted a 
ronY~rsion and th~r~by giy·p plaintiff a right to sue for 
thP 1narket value of the goods, \vhen subsequent to the 
ronver~ion plaintiff sold his int~r~st in the goods to some-
one ~lsP f Does plaintiff believe that he can have his cake 
and eat it to J? ( 1an he sell these good to a third party, and 
~till make defendant buy the same goods on a conversion 
theory? Can he J? Particularly \vhen defendant has 
bought tlh' very srune goods fro1n the third party, rely-
ing on plaintiff~ repr~sentation that the third party also 
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owned all of plaintiff's interest~ Has plaintiff elected his 
remedy when he decides to sell the goods to another, 
rather than claim a conversion against defendant~ Or, 
has plaintiff become estopped to claim conversion, after 
he tells defendant face-to-face, even in front of the as-
signee, that he has sold everything to the assignee, and 
that the defendant should immediately deliver it to the 
assignee~ If not an estoppel or election, is it a waiver? 
Yes, however, viewed, the uncontroverted and un-
controvertible fact of plaintiff's continued claim and 
conduct asserting O\\~nership, after the conversion, cul-
lninating in the assignment, effectively destroyed \Yhat-
ever cause of action that plaintiff might have had for 
conversion. This fact, in and of itself ,makes it unneces-
sary for this ~court to decide the case on any other legal 
or factual issues. 
Defendant is entitled to a reversal of the judgment 
of the lo\Yer court, in its entirety, and an a\\Tard of judg-
Inent to defendant and against plaintiff in the amount 
of $1,250.00 as delinquent lease payments as prayed for 
in the counterclai1n, and costs of this action, including 
the appeaL 
Respectfully subn1itted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney for defendant-
respondent 
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